In the Netherlands, the legal consequences of a transfer of undertaking are especially unclear - or even: unreasonable - in the case of collective labour agreements. At the current state of affairs, employers will be bound by rights and obligations contained in those agreements even after the agreement itself has expired. Moreover, employees may, under certain circumstances, pick their labour conditions from different collective agreements and pick the most favourable ones (cherry picking). The author seeks to find a solution to these and other problems relating to the transfer of collective labour agreements.

The Dutch Labour Inspectorate, that is allotted with the task of supervising the Dutch Working Conditions Legislation, is one of the public bodies currently envisaged by the Dutch government for a reduction in staff. Also, the Inspectorate is being amalgamated with two other supervising bodies under the responsibility of the minister of Social Affairs. This article analyses whether these developments are in line with international labour law (notably ILO convention 81, the Labour Inspection Convention 1947). It is asserted that both the reduction in staff and the reorganisation constitute a breach of ILO Convention 81. Instead of reducing the number of inspectors, the number should in fact be doubled to meet the ILO Standard in this respect. Also, the Inspectorate should be given the means to further build its expertise (notably in the field of occupational diseases and emerging risks). Furthermore, the independence from politically motivated policies should be strenghtened.

In this article, I will plead two 'new' proceedings against an inferior permission to terminate employment: (1) an appeal to the nullity of the permission to terminate employment and (2) an appeal to the nullity of the withdrawal. These procedures offer the employee an adequate remedy in the light of article 6 ECHR, in contrast with the claims for unfair dismissal (in Dutch: kennelijk onredelijk ontslag) and wrongful government act.